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4 
Summary	  
Since 1967, public international law has had many treaty additions through 
so-called nuclear weapon free zones, treaties that have been created through 
legally binding agreements to pursue complete nuclear disarmament within 
a geographically defined area. The international community has for decades 
discussed the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, but without 
prompting any concrete action. In the light of recent instabilities and the 
enhanced risk of regional nuclear weapon proliferation, the zone has come 
up for discussion once again, this time with the ambition of an extended 
scope in order to establish “an effectively verifiable Middle East Zone Free 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their 
delivery systems”. This initiative for a weapons of mass destruction free 
zone is a complete novelty, and stands to face many challenges. This thesis 
explores, with a legal policy perspective, the essential requirements for the 
establishment of a successful weapons of mass destruction free zone in the 
Middle East, by looking at weaknesses in existing disarmament treaties 
(regulating nuclear, biological and chemical weapons) as well as the 
previous treaties establishing nuclear weapon free zones.  
The thesis sheds light on several future problems such as: the lack of a 
verifiable and legally binding treaty regime for delivery vehicles, i.e. 
missiles and other means of delivering the weapon to its intended target, the 
likelihood of normative conflicts developing if the future zone follows the 
precedents set by earlier nuclear weapon free zones, the delicate issue of 
removing the existing Israeli nuclear arsenal from the zone and its 
subsequent destruction, and how to compensate for weaknesses in 
verification of compliance regarding biological weapons.  
Concluding by a set of recommendations, the thesis answers the 
research question by offering a list of proposed treaty provisions. These 
include, inter alia, establishing a supporting regional organisation for 
matters of verification and confidence building, limiting the geographical 
scope of marine areas to the territorial seas in order not to repeat the 
mistakes of earlier nuclear weapon free zones, and adding the right to and 
obligation of challenge inspections to enhance verification of compliance 
regarding all three types of weapons of mass destruction. 
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Sammanfattning	  
Med start år 1967 har folkrätten fått en rad tillskott av multilaterala 
överenskommelser genom uppkomsten av en ny typ av traktat. Dessa traktat 
har skapats för att stifta så kallade kärnvapenfria zoner och är i grunden 
folkrättsligt bindande överenskommelser som etablerar komplett nedrust-
ning av kärnvapen inom ett geografiskt avgränsat område. Det inter-
nationella samfundet har under flera decennier diskuterat etableringen av en 
sådan zon i Mellanöstern, dock utan föranleda några konkreta åtgärder. I 
ljuset av den senare tidens instabilitet i regionen och risken för spridning av 
kärnvapen, har zonen återigen blivit föremål för diskussion, denna gång 
med ambitionen att utöka dess räckvidd till att omfatta inte bara kärnvapen 
utan alla massförstörelsevapen samt dess vapenbärare, det vill säga 
nukleära, biologiska och kemiska vapen samt missiler eller andra medel för 
levererandet av vapnet till sitt mål. Initiativet för en massförstörelsevapenfri 
zon utgör en ny idé och har många utmaningar framför sig. Denna uppsats 
använder sig av en rättspolitisk metod för att utforska de grundläggande 
förutsättningarna för inrättandet av en framgångsrik massförstörelsevapenfri 
zon i Mellanöstern. Detta mål uppfylls genom att undersöka svagheter i 
såväl de existerande nedrustningskonventionerna (som reglerar nukleära, 
biologiska och kemiska vapen), som de redan existerande traktaten som 
inrättar kärnvapenfria zoner.  
Uppsatsen belyser flera framtida problem, bland annat bristen på en 
verifierbar och folkrättsligt bindande traktatregim för vapenbärare, sannolik-
heten för framtida normkonflikter om den blivande zonen följer prejudi-
katen satta av tidigare kärnvapenfria zoner, den känsliga frågan om 
avlägsnandet av den israeliska kärnvapenarsenalen från zonen och dess 
efterföljande förstörelse samt hur man kan kompensera för svagheter i 
verifikationsåtgärder vad gäller efterlevnad av traktatförpliktelser för 
biologiska vapen. 
Avslutningsvis mynnar uppsatsen ut i en samling rekommendationer 
som besvarar frågeställningen genom en lista med föreslagna traktat-
bestämmelser. Dessa inkluderar bland annat inrättandet av en regional 
organisation för stöd i frågor som rör verifikations- och förtroendeskapande 
åtgärder, begränsandet av den geografiska avgränsningen i havsområden till 
att enbart omfatta respektive stats territorialhav samt inkluderandet av rätten 
att efterfråga och skyldigheten att acceptera utmaningsinspektioner 
(challenge inspections) för att förstärka verifikationen av traktatefterlevnad 
för alla typer av massförstörelsevapen.  
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Abbreviations	  
BTWC Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
the Code  Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile 
  Proliferation 
the General Assembly United Nations General Assembly 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
LAS League of Arab Nations 
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NPT Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 
NSA Negative security assurance 
NWFZ Nuclear Weapon Free Zone 
NWS Nuclear Weapon State 
Non-NWS Non-Nuclear Weapon State 
OPANAL  Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (Organismo para 
la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la 
América Latina y el Caribe) 
OPCW  Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons 
the Secretary General United Nations Secretary General 
the Security Council United Nations Security Council 
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
TCS Treaty on Collective Security 
UN United Nations 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law Of the Sea 
UNDC United Nations Disarmament Commission 
UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 
UNODA United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 
VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction 
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1 Introduction	  	  
1.1 Background	  
Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) hold a special place in public 
conscience, in international debate and in public international law. But why 
are these particular weapons so important? What causes the widespread 
alarm and interest in them? The international expert panel that formed the 
WMD Commission analysed the global situation on these arms in their final 
report “Weapons of Terror” and summarised the reason for their importance 
quite clearly: 
Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are rightly called 
weapons of mass destruction […]. Designed to terrify as well as 
destroy, they have the potential to kill thousands and thousands 
of people in a single attack, and their effects may persist in the 
environment and in our bodies, in some cases indefinitely. 
In a region as conflict-ridden and perpetually unstable as the Middle East, 
the idea of another state possessing WMDs, in reality or simply the mere 
suspicion of it, can have a huge impact on global security. Powerful and 
deadly as they are, WMDs can shift power balances, or imbalances if you 
will, in an instant.  
One of the worst kept secrets in the world is that Israel possesses 
nuclear weapons. Even though this notion for decades has neither been 
confirmed nor denied, the world has accepted the assumption that Israel is a 
de facto Nuclear Weapon State (NWS), albeit not a de lege one.1 In an 
attempt to address this issue, the Shah of Iran introduced the idea of making 
the Middle East a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) already in the 
1970’s2, an initiative publicly applauded but privately dismissed by many 
countries, not at least by the United States. Until recently that is. Few have 
failed to note the current international uproar following Iran’s suspected 
nuclear ambitions, and while it is uncertain if Iran is actually pursuing 
nuclear weapons, the thought of a potential second NWS in the region has 
suddenly made the idea of a Middle Eastern NWFZ very appealing indeed.  
As the entire world has its eyes fixed on the Middle East in general and 
Iran in particular, the problem of nuclear weapons and other WMDs is 
imminent. Until this issue is addressed in a long-lasting way, no other 
                                                
 
1 Federation of American Scientists, Israel: Nuclear Weapons.  
2 Hautecouverture & Mathiot, A Zone free of WMD and means of delivery in the Middle 
East: an assessment of the multilateral diplomatic process 1974–2010, p. 1. 
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measures to ensure regional stability can be seriously discussed. Lasting 
stability can only be achieved once these weapons are out of the equation.  
While the voices calling for such a NWFZ are loud indeed, being 
unrealistic is of no use to anybody, and it is important to be aware that this 
is a process that will require time. On the other range of the spectrum it is 
safe to say that if the issue is left unsolved it will lead to a regional arms 
race. The King of Saudi Arabia was quoted declaring that if Iran is 
successful in creating nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia will acquire them too3. 
A nuclear-armed Iran would change dynamics and cause a chain reaction 
and an arms race that will be nearly impossible to curb.   
 
1.2 Purpose	  and	  research	  question	  
The project of a Middle Eastern NWFZ evolved over time to comprise not 
only nuclear weapons, but biological and chemical weapons as well. What 
began as an initiative for a NWFZ has now become a project pursuing a 
WMD-free zone, making it the first of its kind. The mandate for the 
upcoming negotiations on the WMD-free zone is “the establishment of an 
effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, 
nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems”4. The extents 
to which we can draw inspiration from existing treaties establishing 
NWFZs, are therefore limited. A lot has been written and several reports 
serve as guidelines in the creation of NWFZs, but nothing exists covering an 
equivalent zone including WMDs and the means for their delivery. New 
problems arise and new solutions are needed. How, then, can a strong and 
effective treaty regime be created? The purpose of this thesis is to explore 
the essential requirements in making such a treaty successful in reality. The 
overarching research question is therefore: 
What are the essential requirements for the establishment of  
a successful WMD-free zone in the Middle East? 
This ideal outcome, a successful WMD-free zone, needs to be defined with 
one of the following two alternatives: either a strong treaty regime, risking a 
smaller group of signatories, or, a weaker and more flexible treaty regime 
that perhaps is not even binding, which could possibly attract a larger group 
of signatories. This choice of one or the other has become a general trend in 
later years in the arena of international disarmament. The hope of achieving 
treaty universality is sometimes abandoned in order to pursue negotiations 
                                                
 
3 Shalev, Dennis Ross: Saudi king vowed to obtain nuclear bomb after Iran. 
4 Davenport, WMD-Free Middle East Proposal at a Glance. 
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in a smaller circuit of so called “likeminded states”, meaning that the goal 
and objective is shared within the group, which makes it easier for that 
group to go further than in a universal forum, as in for example within the 
United Nations’ many different branches and sub-organisations.  
So in the case of achieving a WMD-free zone, which alternative is 
better: an efficient treaty with a smaller group of signatories, or a looser 
treaty with many? In the context of a treaty zone with a clearly defined 
geographical delimitation, the intended target signatories must all join and 
become states parties. For without near-to-perfect adherence, there will be 
no regional zone to talk of, it is in fact the basic premise of a regional treaty 
that sets the limit and makes comprehensive participation a factor which 
cannot be conceded. It is safe to state that a weaker, more flexible treaty 
requires a certain level of trust, a currency that is very rare in the Middle 
East. Regardless of what the substantial scope will be, the states parties will 
need to ensure that the signatories are in compliance with their legal 
obligations. So for the purposes of this particular region, the only way of 
ensuring trust, and thereby participation to this future treaty, is to make it 
strong in matters of verification and compliance. The research question’s 
demand for a successful WMD-free zone shall thus define the premise of 
success as: a legally binding treaty, including efficient and strong 
verification and compliance mechanisms, with near-to-perfect adherence by 
the regional states, with a minimum of ambiguity in interpretation of the 
treaty provisions, and with a good outlook of gaining negative security 
assurances from NWSs.   
 
1.3 Method	  and	  delimitations	  
This thesis aims to shed light on what tools might support and what tools 
might derail the process of creating a Middle Eastern Treaty that establishes 
a successful WMD-free zone. The nature of this task, the evaluation of de 
lege ferenda, calls for the application of a legal policy perspective. The 
descriptive part of this thesis is treated through a comparative method. Most 
importantly the different existing NWFZs are compared on the basis of 
contentious issues. The comparison is by no means exhaustive but highly 
selective, based on the most sensitive and contentious areas, as this is the 
most efficient and useful way of highlighting what needs to be addressed in 
the future treaty establishing the WMD-free zone. By drawing on lessons 
learned from the existing treaties establishing NWFZs, I intend to explore 
possible solutions for a successful zone. The treaties chosen for comparison 
have been so because of their inherent similarities to the proposed zone. 
Four additional zones are considered nuclear free, but differ too much to be 
 
 
11 
of value in this study. Mongolia has unilaterally declared its non-nuclear 
weapon status but is not relevant as this declaration never underwent 
multilateral negotiations. Furthermore, three multilateral treaties have 
established the Antarctic, the sea-bed, and the outer space free of nuclear 
weapons, but are not relevant as these zones cover areas outside of national 
jurisdiction. 
An analysis of this nature could easily reach the size of a novel, and for 
this reason, I have chosen to focus on the three following areas, which will 
constitute the three following chapters, in order to best answer the research 
question: one part covering the basis for disarmament, a second looking 
back in time by comparing existing NWFZs, and the third exploring the 
specific challenges of the future WMD-free zone in the Middle East. The 
breakdown is specified as follows: 
 
A. Conflicts with, and problems within, existing disarmament treaties 
For each of the three different types of WMDs, a separate disarmament 
treaty has been created: nuclear weapons are covered in the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), biological weapons in the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention (BTWC), and chemical weapons in the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC). Each of these three seek, in different ways, to 
pursue disarmament. Some argue, as will be demonstrated further on, that 
adherence to each separate treaty before the creation of a WMD-free zone, 
is a basic and fundamental requirement. This thesis examines if there are 
merits in not acceding to them, but instead postponing this step for the 
moment by instead going beyond the scope of these three treaties, in the 
new Middle Eastern Treaty itself.  
 
B. Complications in existing treaties establishing NWFZs 
Each existing NWFZ has had its own difficulties and bears different 
weaknesses due to the context it originates from. These past problems are 
likely to have an impact on the negotiations on a WMD-free zone, and by 
comparing them and analysing the resulting complications in their own 
individual context, observations can be made for the upcoming Middle 
Eastern Treaty.  
 
C. Challenges in creating the new treaty regime 
The third part covers the region’s specific challenges and issues of 
delimitations in scope, both geographic and substantial.  What has been said 
so far about delimitations and what legal problems have been foreseen for 
the Middle Eastern Treaty?  
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1.4 Author’s	  remarks	  
This thesis is structured so that each chapter ends with a section 
commenting and analysing the contents of that chapter. A broader analysis 
follows in chapter five, which is concluded with a series of suggestions of 
future treaty provisions. Throughout the text the terms WMD-free zone and 
Middle Eastern Treaty are used as synonyms. The two terms are in fact one 
and the same thing, as the zone will be established by the Middle Eastern 
Treaty. All previous NWFZs are commonly referred to with the name of the 
city in which they were signed. This will also be the case in this thesis, and 
seeing as the process for the WMD-free zone in the Middle East is in its 
infancy, it has no preliminary name. It is thus referred to as the Middle 
Eastern Treaty, plain and simple.  
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2 The	  legal	  basis	  of	  international	  
disarmament	  
This section treats the existing framework that covers the central scope of 
the proposed Middle Eastern Treaty, namely WMDs. The Oxford 
Dictionary defines the term weapon of mass destruction as a “nuclear, 
biological, or chemical weapon able to cause widespread devastation and 
loss of life”. For many reasons, such as: military gain, pressure from civil 
society, international stability, and fundamentally the delicate issue of 
morality, the international community has sought to limit and destroy these 
powerful and dangerous weapons. However, in creating treaties banning 
them, states have been faced with the dilemma of the dual use nature of 
WMDs. Each of them must be allowed to exist for peaceful purposes, and 
the grey zone between civil and military use is often difficult to shed light 
on. The technology that is fundamental for nuclear weapons has the same 
basis as nuclear energy or nuclear power plants that fuel much of modern 
life. Elements that go in to making biological weapons are necessary for 
hospitals and laboratories, and common substances like chlorine and 
pesticides are some of the simplest tools for creating chemical weapons. The 
act of balancing the undeniable merits of banning each type of WMD with 
access and development of their civil and peaceful equivalent, has resulted 
in different outcomes and as an effect, each treaty differs in strength and 
scope.  
 
2.1 The	  WMD-­‐trio	  
2.1.1 The	  Nuclear	  Non-­‐Proliferation	  Treaty	  	  
The NPT is one of the most praised, while at the same time criticised, 
treaties to arise from the UN system. It opened for signature in 1968, 
entered into force in 1970 and addresses, as exemplified by the title, non-
proliferation or in other words the possible spread of nuclear weapons and 
weapons technology to states that do not already possess them. The NPT is 
largely considered to be a success and the most important existing 
disarmament agreement with 190 states parties, including the five NWSs.5 It 
has been criticised for effectively freezing the status quo of 1967 by only 
acknowledging the five nuclear powers of the time as NWSs, viz.: China, 
                                                
 
5 UNODA, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.  
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France, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, and in so doing, creating a first class of “Have’s” and a second class 
of “Have Not’s”. 
In substance, each NWS undertakes not to transfer nuclear weapons or 
weapons technology to any recipient whatsoever, thereby ensuring non-
proliferation6. In turn, each Non-Nuclear Weapon State (Non-NWS) 
undertakes not to receive, nor to seek to manufacture such weapons7. These 
obligations are ensured through bilateral safeguard agreements between 
each state and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)8. The 
reason behind the attractiveness of the treaty to the Non-NWSs of the world 
at the time was due to two factors. Firstly, the NPT clearly stated that it 
would not affect the inalienable rights of the parties to use nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes. In fact, it encouraged cooperation between the states 
parties, and thereby ensured that needs in terms of energy would be met.9 
Secondly, and more importantly, article 6 (2) of the NPT created the 
obligation for all parties, including the actual NWSs, to “[…] pursue 
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the 
nuclear arms race […] and to nuclear disarmament […]”. It is therefore not 
an exaggeration to call the NPT the backbone of nuclear disarmament.  
The NPT also encourages the creation of NWFZs. Its article 7 states that 
“Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude 
regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in 
their respective territories”. The purpose of the NPT is to promote disarma-
ment, and the idea of a NWFZ goes hand in hand with that purpose.  
 
2.1.2 The	  Biological	  and	  Toxin	  Weapons	  Convention	  	  
Opening for signature in 1972 and entering into force in 1975, the BTWC 
banned the development, production and stockpiling of an entire category of 
WMDs, namely biological and toxin weapons10. This convention was 
created in order to strengthen and go beyond the 1925 Geneva Protocol, 
which prohibits the use of biological and chemical weapons in war. This 
norm prohibiting use is argued to have gained the status of customary 
international law and as such ought to be binding on all states, whether party 
to the Geneva Protocol or not.11 Thus, the fact that use of biological 
weapons is not explicitly prohibited in the BTWC should neither be 
                                                
 
6 The NPT, article 1. 
7 The NPT, article 2.  
8 The NPT, article 3.  
9 The NPT, article 4 (1). 
10 UNODA, The Biological Weapons Convention. 
11 Littlewood, Strengthening the Role of the BTWC and the CWC, p. 25.  
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interpreted as something that was left out as compromise, nor as a 
permission to use them. The reason why the wording was left out during the 
negotiations in 1968-1971 was due to fear that the provision might 
potentially undermine the Geneva Protocol and its status as customary 
international law.12 
While the international taboo concerning these weapons might be 
strong, the convention’s verification mechanisms are not. The issue of 
compliance verification is the largest weakness of the BTWC, much due to 
the inherent nature of biological weapons. As opposed to both nuclear and 
chemical weapons, which require large facilities and generate by-products 
when manufactured, most types of biological weapons can be created in 
nothing less than a portable laboratory, hidden in someone’s basement. The 
BTWC consequently relies on good-faith implementation and on states 
parties to live up to their obligations.13 It dictates that the member states 
cooperate through consultations, bilateral as well as multilateral, regarding 
potential concerns about compliance and verification. Disputes regarding 
compliance can be referred to the UN Security Council (the Security 
Council) by states parties, should they suspect another member of violation. 
The voting rules within the Security Council for a decision to carry out an 
investigation of violation of the BTWC are not any different from the 
standard voting rules. This means that the permanent members of the 
council14 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States) continue to possess a de facto veto power against any potential 
Security Council decision to carry out such an investigation.15 
 
2.1.3 The	  Chemical	  Weapons	  Convention	  
Preceded by 12 years of negotiations in the UN Conference on Disarmament 
in Geneva, the CWC opened for signature in 1993. The convention 
efficiently eliminates chemical weapons by prohibiting its states parties to, 
inter alia, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, transfer or use chemical 
weapons. Furthermore, each state party has undertaken to destroy whatever 
chemical weapons it possesses, in accordance with the convention.16  
The CWC entered into force in 1997, thereby finally establishing the 
permanent implementing agency created through the treaty, the 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)17. Based in 
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The Hague, its mandate is “[…] to achieve the object and purpose of the 
Convention, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those 
for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum 
for consultation and cooperation among states parties.”18 
The role of the OPCW is very important and quite strong. In addition to 
support with implementation, the OPCW also assists in so called “challenge 
inspections”, a feature that entitles any state party, which suspects that 
another member state is failing to comply, to request the Director General of 
the OPCW to send an inspection team. The states parties to the CWC have 
committed themselves to the obligation of inspections “anytime, anywhere” 
with no right of refusal.19 
Seven states parties have declared possession of stockpiles of chemical 
weapons: Albania, India, Iraq, Libya, Russia, South Korea and the United 
States.20 As of August 2012, roughly 75% of the world's declared stockpile 
of 71 metric tons of chemical agents has been verifiably destroyed.21 The 
process of destruction is complicated and above all very expensive, due to 
environmental concerns for local populations and safety concerns for the 
people carrying out the actual destruction. As a result, the timeframes that 
were stipulated in the convention have been postponed several times. The 
latest deadline set to April 2012 was exceeded by the Unites States, Russia 
and Libya.22 The two former due to their very large stockpiles and practical 
implications, the latter due to practical problems arisen from the internal 
turmoil after the death of its dictator and leader Muammar Khaddafi.  
 
2.2 Delivery	  vehicles	  
At which point does a device, a vial or a machine become a weapon?  
Definitions vary, but the WMD Commission in its final report defines the 
term as follows: “A simple device that is capable of producing mass 
destruction becomes a weapon only when its user is able to deliver such a 
device effectively to an intended target.”23 
The nuclear weapons dropped over Japan in 1945 were delivered by 
heavy long-range bombers. As these weapons modernised over time and 
became smaller and lighter, so did the variety of aircrafts delivering them, 
such as fighters, missiles and even so called drones, formally known as 
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or UAVs. In addition to traditional aircrafts or 
bombers, deployment methods evolved to include nuclear landmines, depth 
charges and artillery shells.24  
Chemical weapons can be delivered by bombs but also, as repeatedly 
done in World War I, by simply venting clouds of toxic gas. A common trait 
of both biological and chemical agents is that they can be delivered through 
a spray can into a ventilation system or directly into a water supply. Even 
fleas, ticks and rodents are possible means for spreading highly infectious 
biological agents.25   
The bigger the delivery system, the easier it is to track and verify. The 
fact that biological and toxin weapons need so little to cause mass 
destruction poses, as described earlier, the biggest challenge in verification. 
It is therefore quite logical that much of the international effort to control 
WMD delivery systems has addressed ballistic and cruise missiles, which 
require states to undertake major financial and technological investments as 
well as to actually test the missiles in public. These missiles have 
capabilities to deliver weapons over considerable distances, with amazingly 
high accuracy, with little warning and without risk to pilots.26  
What is being done, then, to counter the arms race concerning delivery 
vehicles? In spite of the fact that the preamble of the NPT cites a goal of 
eliminating both nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, there is to 
date no multilateral treaty requiring missile disarmament.27 The most well-
known treaties regulating delivery vehicles stem from the cold war and are 
bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, such 
as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I and II (START), to which the 
latest addition is the New START from 2010.28 
 
2.2.1 Frameworks	  
The international community has had little interest in missile disarmament 
and has rather focused on missile non-proliferation, in other words carefully 
selecting which states get access to this technology, putting a lot of effort in 
keeping it from those deemed to be unstable. This following section treats 
the international legal framework that covers delivery vehicles. 
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18 
2.2.1.1	  Missile	  Technology	  Control	  Regime	  
States possessing or producing nuclear capable missiles have created the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an informal, voluntary, non-
treaty-based arrangement, in order to coordinate and control transfers and 
exports of missiles and missile technology.29 The first discussions on the 
subject of an export control regime began in the early 1980’s between the 
Western powers. Today the MTCR has 34 member states and a couple of 
states, though not actual members, have pledged to abide by the MTCR 
Guidelines.30 
Each member state is required to establish national export control 
policies for the delivery vehicles, underlying components and technologies 
that appear on the regime's Material and Technology Annex. The content of 
that annex is changed through consensus decisions. Potential exports of such 
items are evaluated on a case-by-case basis and members should exercise 
caution in approving such deals, as there are no veto rights regarding 
another member’s exports. The evaluation of a potential export deal should 
take into account a number of factors, the essence of which is the concern 
that the intended recipient is pursuing, or has ambitions for acquiring, 
WMDs.31 
 Being a non-treaty association for governments that share common 
interests, the MTCR has no formal mechanism for compliance enforcement. 
Even the form of implementation varies from state to state, ranging through 
laws threatening sanctions (as in the case of the ardent MTCR-participant 
the United States) to simple policy declarations. Even though the MTCR is 
considered a soft and weak legal tool, it is strong because of everyday 
political realities. The international uproar caused in 1988 after China’s sale 
of long-range missiles to Saudi Arabia strengthened the MTCR and no 
further sales of that magnitude has occurred since.32  
 
2.2.1.2	   The	   Hague	   Code	   of	   Conduct	   Against	   Ballistic	   Missile	  
Proliferation	  
The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (the 
Code) was brought into effect in November 2002 in The Hague. The Code 
is a non-binding political tool aimed at regulating and curbing ballistic 
missile proliferation across the globe, all in order to impede possible 
deliveries of WMDs. Intended to supplement the MTCR, the Code consists 
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of a set of recommendations for confidence building tools, such as 
providing pre-launch notifications for launches of ballistic missiles and 
space-launch vehicles, as well as for test flights. Furthermore, the 
subscribing states commit themselves, politically but not legally, to 
submitting annual declarations of their respective national policies on 
ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles.33  
The Code has, thus far, 134 subscribing states, including the two most 
active countries in the field, Russia and the United States.34 In spite of its 
large group of subscribing states, the effective implementations of the Code 
have proved to be discouraging. In 2009 only 13 % of the launches 
conducted by subscribing states were notified in advance and not a single 
launch conducted by Russia or the United States was notified.35  
 
2.2.2 The	  question	  of	  legality	  
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) from 1969, defines 
a treaty as “an international agreement concluded between states in written 
form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation” (emphasis added).36 In the arena of international law the 
negotiating states always stand facing two courses, either to create just the 
clearly defined and strong treaty envisaged, or to accept the need for 
compromise in order to achieve a larger group of states parties to the treaty 
in question, generating a weaker treaty in substance but a stronger treaty in 
participation. These two considerations vary greatly depending on the issue 
at hand. In some areas, the need for large participation is so great that the 
agreements negotiated do not even take on the form of a legally binding 
agreement, and instead are shaped as politically binding instruments, as 
exemplified by the MTCR and the Code. These latter are considered to be 
examples of the term “soft law”, non-legally binding but with the possibility 
of over time actually gaining binding status and thus binding the states 
through this development into customary law. According to Dinah Shelton, 
professor of international law at George Washington University, the use of 
soft law norms tends to be more common in certain areas of law than 
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others37. For example, soft law norms are usual in the fields of 
environmental regulations and human rights, but very rare in the fields of 
trade regulations and arms control.38 The MTCR and the Code thereby stand 
out by being tools of soft law in a domain where trust is scarce and where 
clearly defined obligations normally are regulated through legally binding 
agreements. 
 
2.3 Comments	  	  
The Middle Eastern Treaty will be negotiated in a context where the trio of 
WMD-treaties make up the background. A question then arises: is it better 
to let the zone demand adherence to each of the existing WMD-treaties, the 
NPT, the CWC, the BTWC, and the frameworks for delivery vehicles, or 
should the Middle Eastern Treaty simply create the same obligations 
without mentioning these treaties? The first alternative is severely flawed. 
While the WMD-trio is legally binding, the same cannot be said for the 
frameworks for delivery vehicles, which poses a substantial problem for the 
Middle Eastern Treaty. For the intent and purpose of the WMD-free zone, it 
is essential that it is legally binding for it to be successful, and while the 
zone can rest on the backs of the binding disarmament treaties for each type 
of WMD, this option does not exist for the frameworks for delivery 
vehicles. With trust and security being the most important consideration, 
these soft law arrangements will not suffice when every element of the 
Middle Eastern Treaty must be legally binding in order for it to be truly 
successful.  
This criticism does not mean that the MTCR and the Code are useless, 
they are, quite the opposite, excellent tools for their respective purposes. 
The very nature of the issue at hand, dealing with sensitive information 
about potential trade deals and political and security assessments of other 
nations, calls for loose and non-binding frameworks. However, accession to 
the MTCR is not only unfit for the purpose of the WMD-free zone, but 
would in fact undermine the very purpose of the MTCR. This regime 
regulates the issue of non-proliferation, trying to ensure that some states (a 
group to which Iran most likely belongs) cannot get access to missile 
technology.  
For the creation of a legally binding regulation of delivery vehicles, two 
options seem relevant: either a more detailed Middle Eastern Treaty 
meticulously regulating the complete removal of delivery vehicles from the 
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region, or, the creation of an equivalent international disarmament treaty 
with the goal and purpose to eliminate delivery vehicles. Seeing as the 
latter, being idealistic and completely unrealistic, will have no chance of 
reaching a greater number of states parties, or at attracting the most relevant 
states to sign, it does not seem to be a viable option and would actually 
derail the process instead of supporting it. We are thus left with one 
conclusion: regardless if the approach is to have the zone demand adherence 
to each of the existing WMD-treaties or to create all obligations 
independently from the WMD-trio, the Middle Eastern Treaty itself must, in 
detail and with full legal binding effect, regulate delivery vehicles as no 
such treaty or agreement exists to date.   
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3 The	  concept	  of	  NWFZs	  
The legal basis for NWFZs is found in article 52 of the UN Charter, which 
allows for the existence of regional security arrangements relating to 
international peace and security. Starting with the denuclearisation of 
Antarctica through the Antarctic Treaty, which was signed in 1959, the 
world has seen an ever-increasing number of states join together to declare 
their lands to be free of nuclear weapons. The existing NWFZs together 
house about 1.9 billion people, spanning over 120 states and 18 other 
territories, and covering more than half of the world’s landmass.39 
 
3.1 The	  NWFZ	  family	  
The figure below shows all nuclear weapon free areas, including those 
excluded through the original delimitations of the thesis.40 
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Currently, six NWFZs are in force in inhabited parts of the world, and four 
of them cover the entire Southern Hemisphere. The regions under NWFZ 
agreements that will be used for comparison henceforth are: Latin America 
through the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, the South Pacific though the 1985 
Treaty of Rarotonga, Southeast Asia through the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok, 
Africa through the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba, and Central Asia through the 
2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk.41  
 
3.2 Defining	  the	  term	  NWFZ	  
In 1975, the international community through the UN General Assembly 
(the General Assembly) defined the concept of a NWFZ in a resolution42 as:  
[…] any zone recognized as such by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations, which any group of States, in the free 
exercises of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a 
treaty or convention whereby:  
     (a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which 
the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for the 
delimitation of the zone, is defined; 
     (b) An international system of verification and control is 
established to guarantee compliance with the obligations 
deriving from that statute. (emphasis added) 
Put it differently, a NWFZ is an arrangement based on a regional treaty that 
obliges and binds the states parties not to allow nuclear weapons on their 
respective territory. Each different treaty is formed by the context in which 
it was negotiated and while the treaties may differ from each other, they all 
share three prohibitions: non-possession, non-stationing, and non-use or 
threat of use of nuclear weapons in the zone.43  
Why are these zones necessary and so very desirable? In addition to 
being tools of stability, transparency and legality, NWFZs allow regions to 
go beyond the obligations of the NPT. The existing NWFZs ban the 
deployment of nuclear weapons, which is not prohibited by the NPT.44 As 
an example, the United States has nuclear weapons deployed in five 
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European states: Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Turkey45, 
which are parties to the NPT as Non-NWSs. Though these types of 
arrangements are not specifically prohibited, there is continuous legal debate 
as to whether or not this is consistent with public international law. Within a 
NWFZ such activities are completely prohibited, illustrating yet another 
merit with these zones, namely their non-discriminatory character. The 
possession of nuclear weapons is forbidden for all.46  
Furthermore, the zones generally require more extensive compliance 
mechanisms and the creation of more comprehensive safeguard agreements 
with the IAEA. Each treaty goes further than the previous one, addressing 
the specific security concerns of each specific region.47 In other words, a 
NWFZ is tailor-made and not a “one-size fits all” creation.   
 
3.3 Points	  of	  weakness	  
Each of the separate NWFZs differs from the others in matter of strength 
and scope. This following section examines earlier points of contention and 
how these shaped the outcome of the treaties. These topics have been 
selected because of their status as recurring subjects for academic debate 
and analysis.   
 
3.3.1 Negative	  security	  assurances	  
The term “positive security assurance” entails a promise to help in case of 
an attack. Consequently, “negative security assurance” (NSA), means a 
promise not to attack. Since the dawn of the nuclear era, states that decided 
not to acquire nuclear weapons have sought ways to receive assurances from 
being attacked by these weapons. After the creation of the NPT and the 
establishment of the terms NWS and Non-NWS, the latter have repeatedly 
and forcefully insisted on gaining legally binding non-use commitments 
from the former, in other words NSAs. This concern has not gone 
unnoticed, yet no such promises have been made in a legally binding way to 
the Non-NWSs as a whole. The use of nuclear weapons on Non-NWSs, and 
threat of such use, is motivation for further nuclear proliferation, and as 
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such, the NWSs stand to gain considerably from making binding promises 
in certain cases.48 As regards general, non-binding and declaratory NSAs, 
the American nuclear doctrine offers a good example. President Barack 
Obama, in his Nuclear Posture Review of 2010, reaffirmed and strengthened 
the United States’ long standing general NSA towards Non-NWSs, with the 
condition that the state in question is party to the NPT and in compliance 
with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations.49 
To date, the only way in which NWS have made legally binding NSAs 
is in the context of NWFZs. All the existing NWFZs include protocols that 
are open for signature to the five NWSs and that create commitments of 
different kind based on each treaty’s different conditions. 50 But even in this 
context the representation is not complete: not all NWSs have signed the 
relevant protocols to all NWFZs, and some NWSs that have signed have 
also made reservations to certain provisions. It is, in other words, a 
complicated picture and a sensitive process. However, without NSAs, the 
states contemplating the potential creation of a NWFZ and thereby the 
renunciation of nuclear weapons, will have no motivation to pursue it.  
Of the five existing NWFZs, only the Treaty of Tlateloco has had its 
additional protocols both signed and ratified by all five NWSs, which 
occurred as early as 1979. The Treaty of Bangkok and the Treaty of 
Semipalatinsk, on the other hand, have no signatories at all to their 
additional protocols. The remaining two, the Treaty of Rarotonga and the 
Treaty of Pelindaba, are nearly complete with signatures and ratifications 
from all of the NWSs except the United States.51 President Obama 
submitted the two protocols to the Senate for ratification in May 2011 but 
the process, though on-going, is very slow.52 
What is the reason for these great variations in adherence? Why are 
some more attractive than others? In general, each treaty goes further than 
the former, adding different obligations depending on the context of each 
region. With more obligations added, often in regions where much is at 
stake, the willingness to offer this ultimate security guarantee becomes more 
restrictive. The individual challenges and results of the existing NWFZs will 
be described in the following.  
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3.3.2 Limiting	  the	  Seas	  
Drawing the lines of a NWFZ in relation to the sea has proved to be quite 
difficult. Coastal states have full jurisdiction over their internal seas, 
archipelagic waters and territorial sea.53 However, any state has the right of 
innocent passage in such waters.54 The regional states of a NWFZ can limit 
their own right to possess or deploy nuclear weapons anywhere, but cannot 
limit, by an agreement among themselves, the general right of extra-zonal 
states to navigate ships, potentially containing nuclear weapons, in waters 
which they have the right to use according to international law.55  
The geographical scope of the Treaty of Tlateloco contains, in addition 
to the territories and territorial seas of the zonal states, considerable areas in 
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, hundreds of kilometres off the coasts of 
Latin America, thereby encroaching on the high seas. All five NWSs have 
ratified the relevant protocols, which includes this extensive geographical 
definition, but simultaneously they all made unilateral declarations 
contradicting that very definition. The NWSs, though bound by their 
signatures to respect the denuclearisation of Latin America as “defined, 
delimited and set forth”56 in the treaty, objected to this extended scope by 
stating that they considered this restriction on their freedom at sea to be 
unacceptable.57 Contrastingly, the Treaty of Bangkok, still exceeding the 
territorial seas, but without including waters defined as the high seas, 
stipulated the denuclearisation of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the 
states parties.58 The NWSs have yet to sign the protocol to the Treaty of 
Bangkok due to their objection to this geographical inclusion. The NWSs 
also raised the issue that the different zones of the South China Sea are not 
clearly defined, making the scope of the treaty, and thereby the obligations 
of the protocols, ambiguous.59 
 
3.3.3 Military	  bases	  
The Treaty of Pelindaba still awaits American ratification, a process 
prolonged due to a contentious issue surrounding the presence of an 
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American military base on the island of Diego Garcia, located within the 
geographical treaty area. The island in question is part of the Chagos 
Archipelago, a group of islands that are the subject of a dispute of 
sovereignty between the United Kingdom and Mauritius60. The African 
Union considers the islands to be part of Mauritius and has therefore 
included them in the geographical scope, as illustrated in the attached map 
to the treaty. It cannot be known whether nuclear weapons were ever stored 
on Diego Garcia in the frequent use of the base during the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, as it is policy to never disclose present or past locations of 
nuclear storage.61 However, both the United Kingdom and the United States 
noted that they do not consider the zone to include Diego Garcia due to the 
pending diplomatic dispute of sovereignty. Subsequently, Russia waited 
until 2011 to ratify and when eventually doing so, linked a reservation 
declaring that its NSAs do not apply to Diego Garcia.62 The issue, 
potentially becoming a substantial problem in the future, has thus been left 
unsolved, setting a troubling standard for future NWFZs in not addressing 
the actual contentious issues.  
 
3.3.4 Testing	  and	  dumping	  
All of the existing NWFZ treaties include some sort of provision prohibiting 
nuclear testing and obliging the zonal states to prevent such tests within the 
zone.  However, the issue has been more important and sensitive in some 
zones than in others, much due to their individual historical context. The 
states parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga in the South Pacific have 
historically been severely affected by the testing of nuclear weapons. 
Between themselves, the NWSs conducted hundreds of atmospheric and 
underwater detonations. The regional states insisted upon including a 
prohibition on such testing within the zone and, fearing radioactive 
contamination of the marine environment, also prohibited the dumping of 
nuclear waste at sea.63 France, having already conducted nuclear detonations 
on some of the islands in the region, was planning to continue the testing 
and subsequently refused to sign the relevant protocol for many years. 
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Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom signed the protocol until 
1996 after France declared its intention to stop nuclear testing in the area.64  
The issue of nuclear testing was also sensitive in the negotiations 
leading up to the Treaty of Semipalatinsk, which covers Central Asia. The 
area surrounding the city of Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan was the Soviet 
nuclear testing ground for over 40 years. The nuclear detonations, 456 in 
total, over the years caused widespread disease and affected the local 
population similarly to those of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.65 
 
3.3.5 Existing	  security	  arrangements	  
In the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Semipalatinsk, a very large 
hurdle appeared in the form of a pre-existing regional security arrangement, 
namely the Treaty on Collective Security (TCS), also referred to as the 1992 
Tashkent Treaty. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are, 
together with Russia, obligated to give each other “all assistance necessary 
in response to aggression”.66 During the negotiations of the NWFZ, the 
question arose whether or not this provision in the TCS could possibly allow 
the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of another state 
party to the TCS. The Russian stance is that it does allow such deployment 
if deemed necessary after a joint decision67. The United States, France and 
the United Kingdom objected loudly to this standpoint, insisting that it 
would undermine the fundamental idea behind the establishment of a 
NWFZ.68 These three western NWSs argued that the creation of a NWFZ 
would render pre-existing agreements, allowing deployment of nuclear 
weapons, void. As basis for this line of reasoning, they referred to the UN 
guidelines on NWFZs but also, and more importantly, to customary law and 
the rule of lex posterior derogat legi priori, codified in the VCLT, 
demanding that the most recent law takes precedence over older laws69. In 
the end, this following provision was included in the final treaty text as 
article 12: 
This Treaty does not affect the rights and obligations of the 
Parties under other international treaties which they may have 
concluded prior to the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.  
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The Parties shall take all necessary measures for effective 
implementation of the purposes and objectives of this Treaty in 
accordance with the main principles contained therein. 
Should this article be interpreted as giving the Treaty of Semipalatinsk the 
meaning that this NWFZ is only nuclear free until changed by a “joint 
decision”, it would render the treaty worthless. The three objecting NWSs 
have yet to sign the protocol granting NSAs.70 
 
3.3.6 Nuclear	  military	  research	  
As the international community right now focuses on Iran, fearing its 
potentially growing nuclear capability, it might be useful to examine an 
interesting provision from the Treaty of Semipalatinsk and the Treaty of 
Pelindaba. Article 3 of both treaties prohibits the conduct of nuclear military 
research, a provision that does not appear in the other NWFZs. The states 
parties to these two treaties are bound to not carry out nuclear military 
research themselves but also not to allow such conduct within their 
territories by anyone, nor to receive or offer assistance in this matter to 
anyone.71  
The Treaty of Semipalatinsk goes even further by referring to the 1997 
IAEA Additional Protocol, which offers more intrusive verification 
measures. These broad measures stemming from this protocol gives the 
IAEA the authority to carry out inspections on all parts of a state’s nuclear 
fuel cycle, which comprises, inter alia, undeclared facilities, uranium mines, 
and any other place where nuclear material is, has been, or can be present.72 
 
3.4 Comments	  
One striking similarity between many of the contentious issues in past 
NWFZs is the fact that they are caused, infected or worsened by 
reservations. The right to make a reservation to a treaty provision is 
regulated in article 19 (a) of the VCLT and declares that ”A State may, 
when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, 
formulate a reservation […] unless the reservation is prohibited by the treaty 
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[…]”. If the right to make a reservation can be excluded, what, then, is the 
merit in keeping this very right? Once again, the answer is the possibility of 
ensuring a greater number of states parties to any given treaty. However, 
with the right to make reservations follows the increased risk of 
undermining a treaty. And in this particular type of treaty that ensures the 
removal of nuclear weapons, there is no meaningful reason to allow 
reservations. There is simply no halfway manner of joining a NWFZ, either 
you’re in or you’re not. The only way of ensuring a legally binding 
obligation free from undermining variations is by solving the underlying 
contentious issue that causes the reservation. The right to make reservations 
was denied in all of the NWFZs73, but the situation is not the same in the 
Additional Protocols where the NWSs, in some treaties but not in all, have 
had the right to make reservations. For example, the Treaty of Tlateloco 
does not allow reservations to the obligations in the Additional Protocol II, 
but the Treaty of Pelindaba makes no mention of it at all74. Furthermore, the 
NWSs possess a powerful trump card that can, in practical and not in legal 
terms, be equated with a reservation. I am of course referring to refusal to 
grant NSAs. Though not actual parties to of any of the zones, their 
ratification of the Additional Protocols constitutes the crowning 
achievement of all NWFZs, and the very reason each zone motivated its 
states parties to join in the first place. I would not go so far as to say that a 
NWFZ is useless without NSAs, but they are the underlying goal for their 
creation, any zone’s raison d’être. Important as they are in any given region 
and any given NWFZ, they have never been more important than now. In 
the context of the Middle Eastern WMD-free zone, NSAs from all five 
NWSs are absolutely essential. While it is a recurring mantra that a NWFZ 
is a project by the countries in the region for the countries in the region, the 
regional states will simply not feel safe without concrete NSAs and this 
project then risks a quick collapse if NSAs cannot be achieved in a short 
period of time.  
The substantial problems that have been the reason for reservations or 
objections in past NWFZs do not pose the same degree of risk for causing 
complications in the future. The problems caused by testing of nuclear 
weapons and dumping of nuclear waste, will most likely not impact the 
negotiations of a Middle Eastern Treaty noticeably. Technology has since 
then evolved and the need for atmospheric testing does not exist to the same 
extent anymore. A general ban would of course be an integral part of a 
WMD-free zone, as would a ban on nuclear military research and the 
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demand for comprehensive safeguard agreements with the IAEA. These are 
essential tools for trust building and for creating a strong treaty with regards 
to verification of compliance, and thus also a necessity for a successful 
WMD-free zone.  
The issue of existing security arrangements poses a problem. The 
sensitive issue that caused problems in the Treaty of Semipalatinsk is a case 
of normative conflict. This particular conflict was solved to the advantage of 
the zonal states and perhaps mostly to the advantage of Russia, but to the 
great detriment to purpose of the treaty and thereby also to the actual 
NWFZ. Normative conflicts will be explored in more detail in section 4.5.2.  
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4 Creating	  a	  new	  treaty	  
The challenge ahead for the Middle Eastern Treaty is not only that of being 
the first of its kind in comprising all WMDs, but also addressing the 
regional tensions and numerous conflicts that sometimes appear to be 
overwhelming and unsolvable. This sections treats the context in which the 
WMD-free zone initiative was born, the scope of the future zone, its 
inherent problems and future challenges.  
 
4.1 The	  evolution	  of	  an	  idea	  
That which began as a project destined to help ease and possibly solve the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, over time evolved to a broader regional approach on 
disarmament. In 1974, during the aftermath of the fourth Arab-Israeli war, 
Iran, possibly inspired by the Treaty of Tlateloco, suggested the creation of 
a NWFZ in the Middle East.75 With the support from Egypt, the joint 
initiative in the UN resulted in a General Assembly resolution in December 
of that year76. Each year since, the General Assembly has adopted a 
resolution on the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East, and from the 
1980’s and onwards Israel ceased abstaining on the resolution, making it 
possible to adopt it without a vote.77 
In spite of the widespread theoretical support for the initiative, nothing 
concrete happened until the region once again was destabilised. After the 
end of the Iran-Iraq war78 in 1988 the General Assembly used the 
momentum of the regional cool-down and requested the UN Secretary 
General (the Secretary General) to commence a study on the establishment 
of a NWFZ in the Middle East. It had become increasingly apparent towards 
the end of the war that Iraq had been using chemical weapons extensively, 
and that the country was producing the blister agent known as mustard gas, 
as well as the nerve agents tabun, sarin and cyclosarin. One of the largest 
known chemical attacks was carried out against the Kurdish town of 
Halabja, killing nearly 5 000 civilians.79  
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In April 1990, Egypt’s president Hosni Mubarak reacted to the use of 
chemical weapons and suspicions of an Iraqi nuclear programme by 
declaring his country’s initiative to install a WMD-free zone in the Middle 
East, thus for the first time raising the topic of an extended scope of a 
NWFZ to cover biological and chemical weapons as well. In October that 
same year, the Secretary General published the requested “Study on 
Effective and Verifiable Measures which Would Facilitate the 
Establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East”.80  
Later on, after the Gulf war81 and following the cease-fire agreement of 
1991, Iraq admitted to having pursued a large scale WMD-programme, 
including, inter alia, complete nuclear weapon designs, 36 kilograms of 
weapon grade highly enriched uranium, 25 missile warheads filled with 
anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin, and very large amounts of various 
toxic solutions.82 This situation led to action by the Security Council, which 
in 1991 passed a resolution that condemned Iraq and recognised the 
importance of establishing a WMD-free zone in the region.83 The General 
Assembly followed the development and extended its annual resolution 
supporting the Middle Eastern NWFZ to comprise all WMDs, into a WMD-
free zone resolution.84 
The next important milestone for the zone was reached in May 1995 
when the zone was set as an agenda item at the NPT Review and Extension 
Conference. This very important step was one of the essential components 
that made it possible to extend the NPT indefinitely85. Needless to say, the 
NPT states have continuously supported the concept of a Middle Eastern 
WMD-free zone – Israel not being party to the NPT. That review conference 
ended with a resolution (co-sponsored by Russia, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States) calling for “the establishment of an effectively verifiable 
Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical 
and biological, and their delivery systems.”86 The resolution also called on 
the NWSs to “extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with 
a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle 
East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and 
their delivery systems.” Even though, as mentioned earlier, the only nuclear 
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weapons capable state in the region is not party to the NPT, from this point 
on, the idea of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East became imbedded in 
the NPT context and now constitutes an integral part of the well-being of the 
NPT process.87 
No further progress was made for ten years, and the 2005 NPT Review 
Conference collapsed largely due to frustration over the standstill and lack 
of commitment by the state sponsors. It was therefore essential that the 2010 
Review Conference did not repeat the same disaster, and with this as fuel 
for negotiations, the states parties managed to forge consensus on several 
points to promote the implementation of the 1995 resolution. The Review 
Conference culminated by calling on the Secretary General and the three co-
sponsors of the 1995 resolution to convene a conference in 2012 for the first 
round of negotiations on a WMD-free zone, to be attended by all states of 
the Middle East.88 Towards the end of the autumn of 2012 it became clear 
that, due to political tensions and renewed hostilities in Gaza as well as a 
significant escalation in the Syrian civil war, the conference would not take 
place within the dedicated timeframe of 2012. It is at the present moment 
uncertain if the conference will be rescheduled to another date in 2013, but 
seeing as this conference is not only crucial for regional stability, but also an 
imperative for the NPT process, it seems likely that it will take place, in 
some form, during 2013.  
 
4.2 Geographical	  scope	  
The Middle Eastern WMD-free zone is thought to cover a fairly broad 
geographical area. The exact scope of the treaty was first outlined by the 
IAEA in a study from 1989 and defined the zone as covering the area 
extending from Libya in the west to Iran in the east, and from Syria in the 
north to Yemen in the south89. While this definition was appropriate for a 
long time, today it is somewhat limited. Far more suitable would be to 
include all member states of the League of Arab Nations (LAS) plus Iran 
and Israel in the geographical scope. States such as Djibouti, Somalia and 
the Comoros might lack relevance to the problem at hand, but as part of the 
LAS they ought to have the possibility to join, and by being minor in this 
context there is no need to take their potential demands in consideration. In 
other words, neither their participation nor the possibility of them declining 
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involvement would have any impact on the on-going process.90 Instead, the 
merits of including the LAS as a whole in an agreement of this magnitude 
would be a great tool for long-lasting regional stability. 
As Iran borders a de facto NWS, Pakistan, some argue that it would be a 
considerable advantage to include it in the zone.91 However, this question 
causes disagreement in the international debate. The Arab position on the 
geographical scope of the WMD-free zone excludes both Turkey and 
Pakistan. Neither is considered to be a realistic negotiating party due to 
different loyalties and priorities, Turkey because of its membership in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Pakistan due to its arms 
race with India.92 I am inclined to agree with the latter and there ought not 
be any difficulties for Israel to accept this standpoint either, neither Turkey 
nor Pakistan poses a direct or immediate security threat for Israel. On the 
issue of NSAs however, the question is different. Although non-NPT NWSs 
are generally not invited to sign the relevant protocols, this might be the first 
time this could be necessary. The presence of a de facto NWS so close to the 
zone will cause many of the regional states and not only Israel, to demand 
some sort of security assurance.  
 
4.3 Substantial	  scope	  	  
What are the basic conditions for a NWFZ? As more and more such zones 
have been created over the years, the standard definition of a NWFZ has 
grown and now comprises more requirements, yet at the same time is more 
generous in terms of flexibility and membership. 
 
4.3.1 The	  Mubarak	  plan	  
The plan for a WMD-free zone93 put forth by president Mubarak in 1990, 
emphasised three elements in particular:  
(1) All weapons of mass destruction, without exception, should be 
prohibited in the Middle East, i.e. nuclear chemical, biological 
etc. 
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(2) All States of the region, without exception, should make equal 
and reciprocal commitments in this regard. 
(3) Verification measures and modalities should be established to 
ascertain full compliance by all States of the region with the 
full scope of the prohibitions without exception. 
 
4.3.2 UN	  Guidelines	  
In 1976, a group of experts appointed by the UN Disarmament Commission 
(UNDC) presented a study on what principles should be the basis for the 
creation of a NWFZ. This study somewhat extended the scope by declaring, 
inter alia, that a zonal disarmament commitment can be assumed by not 
only groups of states but also by individual countries as illustrated by 
Mongolia’s nuclear weapons free status based on a unilateral declaration, 
that the commitment must be combined with an effective verification and 
compliance system also set up in the treaty, that cooperation on nuclear 
energy should be encouraged, and that the treaty must not be limited in time 
but instead remain in force indefinitely.94   
In April 1999, the UNDC submitted a report updating the 1976 
guidelines. Just like the 1976 study the UNDC guidelines are non-binding 
recommendations, intended to support states in the process of creating a 
NWFZ, without being exhaustive and without dominating that process. The 
updates comprised changes and new ideas arisen from the Treaties of 
Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba.95 All in all, these guidelines are but 
tools for discussion and negotiations. They all have in common that they 
follow the outcome after its creation, rather than shape it beforehand.  
 
4.4 Common	  points	  of	  criticism	  
4.4.1 	  “First	  peace	  –	  then	  disarmament”	  
Israel has for a long time been supportive of the WMD-free zone initiative 
but maintains that the modus operandi ought to be “first peace, then 
disarmament”. The purpose of the zone would therefore be the conclusion 
of a peace process when stability has been achieved, entering the stage when 
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all other problems have already been solved.96 Contrastingly, all regional 
states except Israel prefer the establishment of the zone as early as possible, 
hoping that the zone can help solve other security problems.97 Both these 
positions are perfectly logical. With Israel being the only NWS in the 
region, the surrounding states desire nothing more ardently than the 
immediate removal of nuclear weapons from the region. Israel, although 
connected to strong allies, trusts no one else on the matter of its own 
security and will not be the first to let go of its trump card.  
However, there are examples of how volatile regions have undergone 
monumental changes and reached stability through disarmament. The Treaty 
of Tlateloco is particularly interesting because it was the first time a ban on 
nuclear weapons was imposed in a densely populated area, and an equally 
unstable area at that. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was the spark that 
moved the states of Latin America to pursue the idea of a NWFZ.98 It took 
until February 1967 to negotiate the final text of the treaty and it didn’t enter 
into force until 2002 because of a provision specifying that the full zone 
would not enter into force until it was ratified by all states within it. 
Formally, this did not occur until Cuba ratified the treaty in 2002. However, 
the treaty permitted individual states to waive that provision and declare 
themselves bound by the treaty, which many did beginning in 1968.  
 
4.4.2 Joining	  the	  WMD-­‐trio	  or	  leading	  with	  the	  zone?	  
Many authorities on the subject, among others the long time nuclear 
weapons expert and defense researcher Jan Prawitz, the most logical step in 
approaching a treaty creating a WMD-free zone would be by using the 
existing WMD-regimes, namely the NPT, the CWC and the BTWC. The 
regional states that are not parties to these treaties therefore ought to accede 
to each of them, as a starting point for the complete elimination of WMDs in 
the region. Easier said than done. In today’s gridlock several states are 
holding off on signing some of the treaties until those who have not go 
ahead and do so. An example is Egypt and Syria, who both link their 
ratification of the CWC to Israel’s accession to the NPT99. The inherent 
problem in this situation is that a lot of pride and prestige is also inevitably 
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linked to these positions, making a compromise even more difficult and 
unlikely.  
One option worth exploring is to make the adherence to the WMD-trio 
secondary in the treaty process, and instead pursue the possibility of making 
the same commitments, that originate from the NPT, BTWC and CWC, part 
of the Middle Eastern Treaty. The Treaty of Tlateloco is such an example. 
In South America, both Argentina and Brazil possessed extensive nuclear 
infrastructure and were close to gaining the ability of producing nuclear 
weapons100. Though neither ever actually developed these types of weapons, 
it was made public in later years that both countries were pursuing covert 
nuclear weapon programmes during the 1970’s and 1980’s.101 In 1992 
however, Argentina and Brazil signed a bilateral agreement to place both 
countries’ nuclear facilities under a mutual supervision authority. 
Additionally, the two rival states both signed comprehensive safeguard 
agreements with the IAEA as a trust building measure.102 They then 
followed to ratify the Treaty of Tlateloco in 1994, prioritising the regional 
NWFZ above the NPT, which was later ratified by Argentina in 1995 and 
Brazil in 1997103. Naturally these measures are to be seen as two parts of the 
same process and demonstrate how political will can, in a short period of 
time, accomplish real and tangible progress in the arena of disarmament. 
Yet the fact that the regional treaty was prioritised stills sends a strong 
signal that the NPT is not the most important tool for regional stability, 
which in essence is exactly what everybody desires the most for the Middle 
East. The NPT, with its discriminatory nature is more important for those 
already party to it, while the regional approach is more urgent and important 
for those aspiring to rid the area of WMDs. I would therefore say that it is 
not essential and not even the most logical step, to demand adherence to the 
WMD-trio as the starting point for the region, but rather that avoiding these 
three regimes, at least initially, can be much more helpful in bypassing the 
stalemate caused by the linkage declared by some of the zonal states.  
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4.5 Potential	  complicating	  factors	  
4.5.1 Passage	  at	  sea	  
As mentioned earlier, the task of setting the geographical limits of a NWFZ 
at sea has proved to be very difficult.104 In our case of the WMD-free zone, 
this issue has the potential of becoming quite the hurdle. The Middle East 
includes several important straits and waterways, such as the Persian Gulf 
and the Suez Canal, that are essential for international shipping in general 
and the shipping of oil in particular105. As marine areas have been included 
in the geographical scope in previous NWFZs, it is very likely and quite 
desirable to include them in the Middle Eastern Treaty as well, the only 
question is to which limit? At this point the zonal states have a choice, either 
to let the WMD-ban include the zonal waters to the limit of preference, 
which would be the consequence if nothing else is specified in the treaty, or 
to add a provision stating that: 
Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice the rights or the exercise 
of these rights by any State under the provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, in particular 
with regard to freedom of the high seas, rights of innocent 
passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage or transit passage of 
ships and aircraft, and consistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations.106 
This provision, which is an exception to the responsibility of the states 
parties to the zone to ensure that nobody possesses or controls any type of 
WMD within their territories, does in fact undermine the goal and purpose 
of the WMD-free zone, but is most definitely a necessary element to include 
as the alternative would cause inconsistency with international law of the 
sea.107 
 
4.5.2 Normative	  conflicts	  
The potential Middle Eastern Treaty stands to face many challenges in its 
negotiation, one of the most concrete will be to steer its development in 
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alignment with its goal and purpose. As with any treaty being negotiated by 
states holding different concerns and objectives, it faces the risk of 
developing normative conflicts, or in other words the situation in which 
multiple rules or norms are applicable, both accidentally as well as 
deliberately. It is not a far-fetched scenario that some states will seek to alter 
wordings of certain provisions to give them dual or unclear interpretations. 
In the field of human rights law, treaties often include provisions stating, in 
essence, that nothing in the current treaty shall be interpreted as going 
backwards. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) is such an example. This treaty is part of the International Bill of 
Human Rights and obliges the states parties to ensure its citizens, inter alia, 
the right of self-determination, equal rights for men and women, the right to 
life etc108. Article 5 (2) of the ICCPR regulates the issue of normative 
conflicts as follows: 
There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the 
fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State 
Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, 
regulations or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant 
does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a 
lesser extent. 
The way this article expresses the line of precedence in interpreting this 
treaty leaves no room for normative conflicts, making the ICCPR very 
strong in substance. This however, is only one way of solving a normative 
conflict in advance. The other is to do the exact opposite. Article 30 (2) of 
the VCLT sets out a general rule to be adhered to provided that nothing else 
has been agreed, stating that: 
When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be 
considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the 
provisions of that other treaty prevail. 
This second alternative was used in the Treaty of Semipalatinsk to clarify 
the precedence of the TCS over the Treaty of Semipalatinsk109. This choice 
made the treaty weak in substance, leaving not only a large loophole for 
potential nuclear presence in the region, but also a trace of doubt that 
undermined the entire Central Asian NWFZ. This example of a normative 
conflict is what must be avoided in the future Middle Eastern Treaty. Such a 
provision will undermine the WMD-free zone to the point of rendering it 
useless, and the Middle Eastern Treaty must, in order to be truly efficient 
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and fulfil its purpose, instead be the prevailing treaty in a normative 
conflict. 
 
4.5.3 The	  nuclear	  elephant	  in	  the	  room	  
One of the most concrete problems the Middle Eastern WMD-free zone is 
facing is the issue of how to address Israel’s existing nuclear weapons and 
its general nuclear capability. In an article published by the UN Institute for 
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), author and disarmament expert Joseph 
Goldblat suggests looking to the Treaty of Pelindaba for inspiration on how 
to address the issue, a treaty he considers to set a precedent for the treaties 
that are concluded with a nuclear capable state as a party to it. South Africa 
is in fact the only state to ever have developed and later destroyed a nuclear 
arsenal. In the 1980’s South Africa succeeded in creating six devices but 
stopped before finishing its seventh, and chose to abandon its nuclear 
weapons program in order to join the NPT110. The Treaty of Pelindaba is 
therefore the only NWFZ treaty that has had to face the challenge of 
including a nuclear weapons capable state.  
The Treaty of Pelindaba includes an obligation of complete destruction 
of any nuclear device manufactured prior to the entry into force of the treaty 
as well as either the conversion of nuclear facilities to a facility for peaceful 
use (nuclear power plants), or the destruction of such facilities, all under 
IAEA supervision. The inclusion of this provision in the future Middle 
Eastern Treaty is thus essential in ridding mistrust and doubt as to if nuclear 
activities are going on.111 
 
4.6 Challenges	  
The previous sections have treated problems that have been more or less 
unique to the individual context of each zone. The following section covers 
three topics that are common denominators for all zones. 
 
4.6.1 Organisation	  
As mentioned earlier, there is established international consensus on the fact 
that a NWFZ should be created by the states of the region for the states of 
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the region. The region owns the initiative of a NWFZ and needs to tailor the 
zone after its own needs. In the making of the Treaty of Tlateloco the 
negotiating states saw fit to create an inter-governmental organisation tasked 
with verifying that the treaty obligations are being met. The states parties to 
the Treaty of Tlateloco are also members of this organisation, which was 
named the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 
and the Caribbean  (OPANAL). The organisation’s main responsibility is to 
supervise that the states parties adhere to the verification and control 
systems, as well as hosting general conferences and consultations on the 
purposes and obligations of the treaty.112 Should a party not be in 
compliance it is up to OPANAL to, first help solve the problem, but if the 
failure to comply should constitute a breach of the treaty, it must notify the 
UN and the IAEA in accordance with the treaty.113 OPANAL is a good 
example of how a relatively small organisation can have a large impact on 
trust building and transparency in relations to a NWFZ.  
In other regions the organisations are structured in different ways and 
often they have evolved from already existing collaborations. The Treaty of 
Bangkok originates from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a 
geopolitical and economic organisation commonly referred to as 
ASEAN.114  The Treaty of Pelindaba is an initiative created within the 
African Union.115 Together they all show the need for a supporting regional 
organisation and this trend ought not to be broken in the Middle Eastern 
zone. In this case there is no existing organisation fitted for the task that 
comprises both Arab nations as well as Israel, but just like the creation of 
the relatively strong OPANAL, such an organisation needs to be created to 
support the Middle Eastern Treaty.  
 
4.6.2 Verification	  
In matters of verification, all NWFZs have gone beyond the verification 
requirements of the NPT. They all have in common that they place an 
obligation on each state party to enter an agreement with the IAEA. This 
agreement is a so-called safeguards agreement that is meant to verify the 
state’s compliance with the treaty in question and that it is not illicitly 
developing nuclear weapons.116 Apart from this recurring and essential 
                                                
 
112 Nuclear Threat Initiative, Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America & the Caribbean.  
113 Nuclear Threat Initiative, Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America & the Caribbean. 
114 Nuclear Threat Initiative, Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty. 
115 Nuclear Threat Initiative, African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone. 
116 Davenport & Kimball, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) At a Glance.  
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obligation, no tangible and concrete verification systems are set up through 
the NWFZ treaties. Relying on the efficient systems of the IAEA is, after 
all, the most logical way to go, not only because of the organisation’s 
resources but also due to the fundamental issue of transparency and trust. In 
terms of compliance verification, political tensions and mistrust between 
two nations is an obvious barrier to effective monitoring, and the best way 
to break this barrier is to lift the question out of the bilateral arena and into 
the multilateral one instead117. With primary reliance on the IAEA and/or 
the OPCW for actual on-the-ground monitoring, a good option is to set up a 
regional verification body, tasked with supervising and managing the 
necessary additional verification agreements.118 OPANAL could serve as 
inspiration for this purpose, but inevitably it needs to be tailored after the 
specific needs of the future Middle Eastern Treaty.  
This line of reasoning will only produce results for nuclear and 
chemical verification, processes that already have a solid infrastructure 
because of the strong CWC and NPT. International verification of 
compliance in terms of biological weapons sets a whole new range of 
demands and the BTWC, being weak on verification, offers no real help.119 
The fact that the biological dimension of the WMD verification system is so 
underdeveloped requires large scale efforts from the zonal states, making an 
organisation shaped and inspired by OPANAL best suited for this 
significant task.  
 
4.6.3 Trust	  and	  withdrawal	  
Each NWFZ has been created based on the premise that the zone in question 
is to remain in force indefinitely. Yet all treaties always include withdrawal 
clauses, as do the treaties establishing NWFZs. The Treaty of Tlateloco, 
being the oldest, is the only one to require as little as three months’ advance 
notice before the withdrawal can take effect. All of the subsequent zones 
went further and required a notice period of 12 months before 
withdrawal.120 
In January 2003, North Korea, a Non-NWS member of the NPT, 
announced its withdrawal from the treaty. Since then, the international 
community has grown weary of two things: firstly the use of disarmament 
regimes as cover for illicit weapons programs, which proved to be the case 
with North Korea, and secondly the dangers of short withdrawal periods. 
                                                
 
117 Aly, Objectives and Approaches of Arab States, p. 14. 
118 Aly, Objectives and Approaches of Arab States, p. 14. 
119 Aly, Objectives and Approaches of Arab States, p. 14. 
120 Davenport & Kimball, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones At a Glance.  
 
 
44 
The NPT, requiring only three months advance notice121, is weak on this 
point. Even with this short notice period North Korea failed to comply. 
However, failure to comply with the three-month-notice requirement does 
not make the withdrawal invalid. The requirement cannot be interpreted as a 
condition that needs to be met, but should rather be seen as a promise on 
behalf of each state party, a promise that could, according to the professor of 
international law Frederic Kirgis, be cause for restitution should another 
state party suffer damages from the withdrawal.122 
 
4.7 Comments	  
The WMD-free zone initiative stands a strong chance of laying the 
foundation for long-lasting stability in the Middle East. But in order to 
achieve this goal, many issues need to be properly addressed. The smart idea 
of including all WMDs in the scope of the zone to begin with, was an 
excellent move to address the security concerns of all states of the region, 
not only those fearing nuclear attacks. This seen in the context where 
linkage of ratification has paralysed the efforts to move states to ratify the 
BTWC, the CWC, and the NPT, gives further basis for the conclusion that 
the substantial goal of the WMD-free zone can be met much quicker and 
much more efficiently if focus is moved from these three disarmament 
treaties to the WMD-free zone instead. This way, pride and policy will have 
less of a possibility of hampering or complicating the ratification process. 
Naturally, these are all steps that are part of the same course, but adherence 
to the BTWC, the CWC, and the NPT, can follow much easier if the 
commitments are seen to be made more or less simultaneously and 
completely reciprocally, which will be the case in ratification of the WMD-
free zone.  
As to the concrete challenges of the Middle Eastern Treaty, one appears 
to be the task of setting up a supporting organisation for the treaty. While 
this might not seem to be a difficult undertaking at first glance, it needs to 
be an organisation beyond reproach in matters of trust. Part three of the 
Mubarak plan from 1990 stressed the importance of verification measures to 
ascertain full compliance by all states of the region without exception. 
Logical as it seems, and customary as it has become in all zones, 
verification is the backbone of each NWFZ. Through verification, trust can 
be built, which over time can lessen the burden of and demands for 
verification. Consequently, the demands on the measures and means of 
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verification are tremendously high in the beginning. The involvement of the 
IAEA, a truly multilateral organisation, ought to be complemented by the 
new supporting organisation, hopefully a truly regional organisation. As 
stressed before, this is a perfect outlet for the principle that the zone is a 
project by the states of the region, for the states of the region. Additionally, 
the establishment of a supporting regional organisation adds flexibility to 
the treaty, not at least in the area of technological advancements. Instead of 
negotiating additional protocols every time something needs to be altered in 
matters of verification, a strong supporting organisation with clear voting 
rules and regular meetings can let the technological advancements influence 
the verification of compliance without having to risk one or several states 
sabotaging new negotiations.  
The interesting, and to my opinion very accurate, point made by 
Frederic Kirgis on the issue of invalid withdrawals, is not very likely to 
influence the negotiations of the future Middle Eastern Treaty. The 
technicality of restitution and damages caused by an invalid withdrawal is 
not really a problem. The fear or suspicion that another state party will 
withdraw from the zone, however, can be a tangible problem. Once again 
this is a measure of trust building and if the treaty in its provisions cannot 
set the continuous tone that it will be in force indefinitely by not allowing 
short withdrawal periods, the treaty will not convey any reason for trust. In 
order to ensure that nothing undermines the negotiations and, in extension, 
the Middle Eastern Treaty, it is essential that the withdrawal period does not 
fall short of 12 months.   
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5 Conclusions	  
After having shed light on the many problems and challenges that face the 
upcoming Middle Eastern Treaty, and having explored the legal background 
in this domain, this following section will conclude by summarizing the 
determined essential requirements for the establishment of a successful 
WMD-free zone. 
 
5.1 Normative	  conflicts	  and	  geographical	  
delimitations:	  avoiding	  past	  mistakes	  
The question of the zone’s geographical scope is not the most delicate one, 
all the major conflict areas fall within even the narrowest of delimitations. 
Far more complicated is the question of the zone’s scope with regards to the 
regional waters. It is crucial that the Middle Eastern Treaty avoid past 
mistakes that have caused normative conflicts and refusals to grant NSAs. A 
generous geographical delimitation that includes areas that fall within the 
high seas is not desirable as this situation presents a normative conflict and 
thus adds ambiguity to the WMD-free zone. Clarity is of utmost importance, 
even if it means making the zone smaller. The Treaty of Tlateloco, with its 
ambitious geographical scope running into the high seas, encroached on 
rights deriving from UNCLOS. Despite the fact that the Treaty of Tlateloco 
comprised a provision prohibiting reservations from both the treaty itself as 
well as from the Additional Protocols, the NWSs signed the Additional 
Protocol and then proceeded with statements declaring themselves not 
bound by obligations that encroach on their rights deriving from UNCLOS. 
This is a classic case of a normative conflict where the Treaty of Tlateloco 
and UNCLOS compete for precedence in interpretation. The point could be 
made that UNCLOS, having by now in parts reached the status of customary 
international law, would take precedence over the Treaty of Tlateloco. 
Regardless, we are left with an element of uncertainty, and the geographical 
delimitation of that NWFZ is ambiguous in a situation where great gains in 
the arena of international nuclear disarmament could have been achieved.  
Nothing indicates that the NWSs would reason any differently today if 
the zonal states where to use such an extensive geographical delimitation in 
the WMD-free zone. For the sake of ensuring actual legal binding effect and 
thereby a successful WMD-free zone, I would suggest that the geographical 
delimitations with regards to the zonal seas, be modest in comparison to the 
far-reaching goals of the Treaty of Tlateloco (including the high seas) and 
Treaty of Bangkok (including the EEZ). The Middle Eastern zone should in 
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its geographical delimitation therefore only include the territorial seas of its 
states parties. 
 
5.2 Strengthening	  verification	  and	  building	  trust	  
All significant disarmament treaties include some sort of verification 
mechanism to ensure compliance. It has been said that the former American 
president Ronald Reagan was very fond of repeating the Russian proverb 
"Doveryai, no proveryai!" translating to “Trust, but verify!”. Whether or not 
this anecdote is true does not matter, however, the truth in those words is of 
highest relevance. In order to ensure fundamental trust building in the 
upcoming Middle Eastern Treaty, its verification mechanisms must be truly 
efficient and satisfactory. As described in chapter two, the BTWC is the 
weakest of the WMD-treaties in matters of verification, undeniably due to 
the inherent features of biological and toxin weapons. There isn’t much to 
be done about the fact that the production of biological and toxin substances 
is difficult to discover. But there are still things to be done in the matter of 
trust building. The CWC’s challenge inspection provision is an excellent 
example of a feature that bolsters trust building. While the challenge 
inspections are not the most efficient verification tools in that they do not 
cover vast quantities, the power and possibility of acting out a suspicion 
gives tremendous strength to the verification regime in form of quality. This 
challenge inspection provision therefore needs to be implemented into the 
Middle Eastern Treaty, creating the possibility for challenge inspections for 
all three types of WMDs.  
The biggest symbol of the dangers that are associated with WMDs, is 
the Israeli nuclear arsenal. Naturally, it will be imperative that the future 
treaty uses this opportunity for further trust building. The dismantlement 
will have to be a public affair under the supervision of the IAEA, 
thoroughly regulated just like in the case of the South African arsenal in the 
Treaty of Pelindaba. On that very note, the earlier mentioned novelty of 
banning nuclear military research is not only desirable, but perhaps even 
necessary in a region where the scientific resources in general and the 
nuclear “know-how” in particular, are centred to Israel and possibly also 
Iran. Of course, in order to even up the balance and live up to the purpose of 
the WMD-free zone, the ban will have to cover all WMDs.  
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5.3 Delivering	  legality	  
The regulation of delivery vehicles in the Middle Eastern Treaty has yet to 
become a significant issue for academic discussion, a fact that is surprising 
since it is a new feature and will require a lot of thought for it to become 
satisfactory regulated in the future treaty, or satisfactory regulated at all in a 
legally binding format. The problems associated with the regulation of 
delivery vehicles, notably the custom of doing so through politically binding 
group policies rather than through treaties, need to be addressed in the near 
future. Regardless if the approach is to have the zone demand adherence to 
each of the existing WMD-treaties or create all obligations independently 
from the WMD-trio, the Middle Eastern Treaty itself must, in detail and 
with full legal binding effect, regulate delivery vehicles in detail as no such 
treaty or agreement exists to date. As earlier defined, the most likely way, 
perhaps even the only way, the WMD-free zone will be successful is if it is 
shaped as a set of legally binding obligations, comprising strong verification 
and compliance mechanisms. This is the only way to achieve complete, or 
near complete, treaty adherence by the regional states.   
 
5.4 Essential	  prerequisites	  
The road ahead to a successful WMD-free zone is very long indeed, and 
faced with a minefield of political barriers. The legal challenges, many as 
they may be, will always take a backseat to political considerations. In 
conclusion, this following list is a compilation of tangible suggestions, 
based on what has been deemed to be essential legal requirements in this 
thesis. Though not aiming to be exhaustive, it provides a basis for what we 
all can hope will become a successful WMD-free zone in the Middle East. 
The suggested treaty provisions originate from various NWFZs and often 
appear in more than one of them. The parts that have been changed or added 
are marked in italic. 
 
5.4.1 Suggested	  inclusions	  to	  the	  treaty	  
The possibility of making reservations opens the treaty up for efforts 
seeking to undermine it, thus making it weaker. The provision is found in all 
covered NWFZs: in article 27 of the Treaty of Tlateloco, in article 17 of the 
Treaty of Bangkok, in article 16 of the Treaty of Pelindaba, in article 13 of 
the Treaty of Semipalatinsk, and in article 14 of the Treaty of Rarotonga. 
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RESERVATIONS 
This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations. 
 
Limiting the geographical scope to a more modest interpretation than some 
previous NWFZs will have the advantage of not creating a normative 
conflict. Neither will the treaty be weakened by the prohibition of 
reservations and/or the likeliness of this creating a situation in which NWSs 
will refuse to offer NSAs. The provision is inspired by article 1 of the Treaty 
of Bangkok. 
 
GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE  
Use of terms: 
For the purposes of this Treaty and its Protocols: 
(1) The ”Middle East weapons of mass destruction free zone”, 
hereinafter referred to as the “Zone”, means the area comprising 
the territories of all States in the Middle East, namely,…, and their 
respective territorial seas.  
 
This provision covers the basic obligations of the treaty, namely the 
destruction of all WMDs and their delivery vehicles. Additionally, it creates 
the possibility for IAEA supervision and cooperation with the regional 
organisation that will be established through the treaty. The provision is 
inspired by article 6 of the Treaty of Pelindaba. 
 
DISMANTLEMENT AND DESTRUCTION 
Each Party undertakes: 
(1) To declare any capability for the manufacture of nuclear explosive 
devices and devices intended for their delivery, chemical military 
substances and devices intended for their delivery, and biological 
and toxin military substances and devices intended for their 
delivery; 
(2) To dismantle and destroy any nuclear explosive device and devices 
intended for their delivery, chemical military substances and 
devices intended for their delivery, and biological and toxin 
military substances and devices intended for their delivery, that it 
has manufactured prior to the coming into force of this Treaty; 
(3) To destroy facilities for the manufacture of nuclear explosive 
devices and devices intended for their delivery, chemical military 
substances and devices intended for their delivery, and biological 
and toxin military substances and devices intended for their 
delivery, or, where possible, to convert them to peaceful uses; 
 
 
50 
(4) To permit the IAEA and the regional organisation established by 
this treaty to verify the processes of dismantling and destruction of 
the above stated devices, as well as the destruction or conversion 
into peaceful uses of the facilities for their production. 
 
The following clause on nuclear military research originates from article 1 
(c) of the Treaty of Semipalatinsk and has been modified to comprise the 
extended scope of the present zone. 
 
MILITARY RESEARCH ON WMDS 
Each Party undertakes […] not to take any action to assist or encourage the 
conduct of research on, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition 
or possession of  
(1) any nuclear weapon, other nuclear explosive device or devices 
intended for their delivery;  
(2) any chemical weapon, chemical military substance or other device 
intended for the spread of a chemical weapon;  
(3) any biological weapon, biological or toxin military substance or 
other device intended for the spread of a biological or toxin 
weapon. 
 
The establishment of a regional organisation is inspired by OPANAL and 
article 7 of the Treaty of Tlateloco. Article item (4) moves the task of 
administratively handling and later concretely carrying out a challenge 
inspection, from the OPCW to the regional organisation in order to cover 
the scope of all WMDs and not only chemical weapons.  
 
REGIONAL ORGANISATION 
(1) In order to ensure compliance with the obligations of this Treaty, 
the Contracting Parties hereby establish an international 
organisation to be known as the “[…]” hereinafter referred to as 
“the Agency.” Only the Contracting Parties shall be affected by its 
decisions.  
(2) The Agency shall be responsible for the holding of periodic or 
extraordinary consultations among Member States on matters 
relating to the purposes, measures and procedures set forth in this 
Treaty and to the supervision of compliance with the obligations 
arising therefrom.  
(3) The Contracting Parties agree to extend to the Agency full and 
prompt cooperation in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty, of any agreements they may conclude with the Agency and 
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of any agreements the Agency may conclude with any other 
international organisation or body.  
(4) Requests for challenge inspections, can, in accordance with the 
Treaty, be made from any Contracting Party and shall be made to 
Agency.  
 
As a measure of strengthening the quality of the verification mechanisms, 
this proposed challenge inspection provision covers all types of WMDs. 
Inspired by the CWC’s article 9 (8) and 9 (9), this will be the first time such 
an obligation enters a NWFZ or WMD-free zone treaty. 
 
CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS 
(1) Each Contracting Party has the right to request an on-site challenge 
inspection of any facility or location in the territory or in any other 
place under the jurisdiction or control of any other State Party for 
the sole purpose of clarifying and resolving any questions 
concerning possible non-compliance with the provisions of this 
Treaty, and to have this inspection conducted anywhere without 
delay by an inspection team designated by the Director-General of 
the Agency […]. 
(2) Each Contracting Party is under the obligation to meet the 
inspection request within the scope of this Convention and to 
provide in the inspection request all appropriate information on the 
basis of which a concern has arisen regarding possible non-
compliance with this Treaty […]. Each State Party shall refrain 
from unfounded inspection requests, care being taken to avoid 
abuse. The challenge inspection shall be carried out for the sole 
purpose of determining facts relating to the possible non-
compliance. 
 
In matters of verification the Treaty of Semipalatinsk went the furthest by 
referring to the 1997 IAEA Additional Protocol, which offers more intrusive 
verification measures. The following provision is unchanged and comes 
from article 8 of the Treaty of Semipalatinsk. 
 
IAEA SAFEGUARDS 
Each Party undertakes: 
(1) To use for exclusively peaceful purposes the nuclear material and 
facilities which are within its territory, under its jurisdiction, or 
under its control anywhere; 
(2) To conclude with the IАЕА and bring into force, if it has not 
already done so, an agreement for the application of safeguards in 
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accordance with the NPT (INFCIRC/153 (Corr.)), and an Additional 
Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)) not later than 18 months after the 
entry into force of this Treaty; 
(3) Not to provide: (i) source or special fissionable material or (ii) 
equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the 
processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any 
non-nuclear-weapon State, unless that State has concluded with the 
IАЕА а comprehensive safeguards agreement and its Additional 
Protocol referred to in paragraph (2) of this article. 
 
Building upon the ICCPR’s article 5 (2), this following provision deprives 
any state the possibility of referring to an existing security arrangement as 
an excuse for dealing with any of the prohibited substances, thereby 
avoiding the situation in which a normative conflict is interpreted to the 
detriment of the WMD-free zone.  
 
RELATION TO OTHER AGREEMENTS 
There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the 
fundamental obligations recognized in this Treaty on the pretext that a State 
Party is fulfilling obligations deriving from another bilateral or multilateral 
agreement. 
 
The Treaty of Tlateloco was the only to offer the possibility to waive the 
provisions regulating the entry into force of the treaty, allowing the regional 
states to consider themselves legally bound much earlier. The inclusion of 
such a clause allowed for certain states to be bound as early as 1970 instead 
of having to wait for Cuba’s ratification, which occurred 32 years later. The 
provision is inspired by article 28 (2) of the Treaty of Tlateloco. 
 
ENTRY INTO FORCE 
All signatory States shall have the imprescriptible right to waive, wholly or 
in part, the requirements laid down in the preceding paragraph regulating 
the entry into force of this Treaty. They may do so by means of a declaration 
which shall be annexed to their respective instrument of ratification and 
which may be formulated at the time of deposit of the instrument or 
subsequently. For those States which exercise this right, this Treaty shall 
enter into force upon deposit of the declaration, or as soon as those 
requirements have been met which have not been expressly waived. 
 
This following provision, gathered from article 13 of the Treaty of 
Rarotonga, respects the development of withdrawal clauses in the treaties 
establishing NWFZs, and sets the withdrawal period to 12 months.  
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WITHDRAWAL 
(1) This Treaty is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force 
indefinitely, provided that in the event of a violation by any Party 
of a provision of this Treaty essential to the achievement of the 
objectives of the Treaty or of the spirit of the Treaty, every other 
Party shall have the right to withdraw from the Treaty. 
(2) Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice twelve months in 
advance to the Director who shall circulate such notice to all other 
Parties. 
 
5.4.2 Suggested	  exclusions	  from	  the	  treaty	  
And finally, as repeated several times, the issue of how to handle a case of 
normative conflict is of utmost importance for the success of this future 
treaty. As an alternative to entering the suggested provision under “Relation 
to Other Agreements”, the other, slightly weaker, alternative is to simply 
refrain from including the provision found in the Treaty of Semipalatinsk as 
article 12. In other words, the Middle Eastern Treaty must not include the 
following provision:  
 
OTHER AGREEMENTS 
This Treaty does not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties under 
other international treaties which they may have concluded prior to the date 
of the entry into force of this Treaty. 
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